












allowing for psychological and cultural effects. 





Università di Torino 





Università di Università Politecnica delle Marche 

















Laboratorio R. Revelli, Collegio Carlo Alberto  Tel. +39 011 670.50.60 - Fax +39 011 670.50.61 
Via Real Collegio, 30 - 10024 Moncalieri (TO)  www.laboratoriorevelli.it - labor@laboratoriorevelli.it 
 
                             LABOR is an independent research centre of the Collegio Carlo Alberto Welfare stigma 
allowing for psychological and cultural effects. 
An Agent-Based simulation study.
Dalit Contini
Università di Torino
Dipartimento di Statistica e Matematica Applicata “Diego de Castro” 






Università di Università Politecnica delle Marche
Collegio Carlo Alberto – LABORatorio R. Revelli
m.g.richiardi@univpm.it
The research is financially supported by the Project MIUR-PRIN 2005 
“La valutazione dell’impatto di interventi pubblici: metodi e studi di caso”. 
Coordinatore nazionale: Enrico Rettore Abstract 
We investigate the effects of income support on unemployment and welfare dynamics when stigma 
is attached to welfare provision. Stigma has been modelled in the literature as a cost of entry into 
welfare. Allowing for psychological factors, we assume that with stigma welfare provision leads to 
lower search effectiveness; moreover, we allow for interaction among agents. Carrying out an 
agent-based simulation study, we find that welfare take-up rates decrease with stigma while welfare 
spells get longer. Unemployment rates are not monotonically related to the amount of stigma, 
implying that we can find higher levels of unemployment with stigma than with no stigma. 
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1.  Introduction 
The effect of income support policies has been the object of extensive theoretical (OECD 2005) 
(Rogerson et al 2005) and empirical research (Moffit 1992; Moffit, 2002; Blank 2002). Focus is on 
work disincentives. The leading paradigm is rational choice: if the benefit is high enough with 
respect to wages, individuals choose welfare and stay out of the labor market. The body of work 
from the empirical literature confirms that transfer programs considerably reduce work effort. 
Aim of this paper is to investigate the effects of income support on unemployment and 
welfare dynamics when social stigma is attached to welfare provision. Stigma is acknowledged as 
one of the determinants of welfare take-up behaviour
1  (Hernanz  et al  2004) and it has been 
modelled as a cost of entry into welfare (Moffit 1983). By providing a disincentive for welfare 
participation, stigma negatively affects take-up rates: the higher the cost of entering welfare, the 
lower the propensity to enter welfare.  
Our   model   is   more   comprehensive.   While   still   embedded   in   a   utility-maximisation 
framework,  individual behaviour is allowed to depend on psychological and cultural factors. 
Referring to the model for welfare dependence proposed in Contini and Negri (2006), we develop a 
discrete-time job search model - assuming we are dealing with “weak” individuals, with low skills 
and low job opportunities - with labor market features taken as given.  We let stigma affect 
preferences by representing a cost of entry into welfare, as other authors do, but in addition we 
assume that with stigma welfare provision can lead to a reduction of search effectiveness, due to 
progressive  loss  of  self-confidence   of  recipients  and to  unfavourable  attitudes  of  potential 
1 The take-up rate is defined as the ratio between the number of individuals receiving the benefit and the total number of 
those who are eligible for it. employers. Moreover, we allow for interaction among individuals: living in environments where 
most people rely on welfare can cause preferences to change by reducing the perceived cost of 
stigma, therefore making the benefit more desirable.
These effects are difficult to investigate empirically, as it is hard to separate the consequences 
of the specific policies under study from the effects of other policies at work and from macro 
changes occurring in the meantime. For this reason, we follow a different approach, carrying out an 
Agent-Based (Tesfatsion 2001) simulation study. The use of simulations is motivated by the fact 
that, given the complexity of the model, it would be difficult to derive analytically all the relevant 
results.  
We explore the consequences of income support for the poor/unemployed, on welfare take-up 
rates, unemployment and welfare participation rates, on unemployment and welfare spell duration. 
Environments with and without stigma are compared. We will show that take-up rates steadily 
decrease with the amount of stigma, while welfare spells get longer. With respect to unemployment, 
we highlight two related results:
- According to traditional job-search models, stigma – by reducing the work disincentive of 
welfare provision and enhancing the relative value of work – should reduce unemployment. 
Allowing for psycho-social effects this conclusion no longer holds: unemployment rates are 
not monotonically related with the strength of stigma. In many situations we find (ceteris 
paribus) higher levels of unemployment with stigma than with no stigma. 
- Without stigma higher benefit levels can coexist with lower unemployment and welfare 
participation rates. Hence, we provide some explanation
2 for the evidence that in Northern 
Europe, where benefits are quite generous and little stigma is attached to benefit provision 
because   of   the   universalistic   character   of   the   welfare   system   (Saraceno   2002), 
unemployment and poverty rates (OECD 2005) and the length of poverty spells (European 
Commission 2002) are generally lower than in Southern Europe, where benefit levels are 
low (OECD 2004; Saraceno 2002) and being in welfare is stigmatized
3. 
These results crucially rest on the assumption that employability decreases with elapsed time 
in welfare with stigma, and it is often reinforced by the interaction effects among individuals.
2 Of course, many other explanations are possible. Unemployment rates are shown to be correlated with the rigidity of 
the employment protection legislation, with union bargaining power, with the strength of active labor market policies 
(Scarpetta 1996). 
3 Unemployment rates for 2003: 8.7% in Italy, 11.3% in Spain, 9.7% in France, 5.4% in Denmark, 5.8% in Sweden, 
4.4% in Norway.  Poverty rates for 2000: 12.9% in Italy, 11.6% in Spain, 7.0% in France, 4.3% in Denmark, 5.3% in 
Sweden, 6.3% in Norway (OECD 2005).    The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we illustrate the features of the job-search 
model, while section 3 is dedicated to the simulation design. Results are discussed in detail in 
section 4. Conclusions follow.
 
2.  The model
In  typical   job-search  models individual  behaviour  is  based   exclusively on rational  choice. 
Individuals are subject to random job offers, that may be accepted or rejected according to the 
future value of utility associated with the different options. Benefit provision to the unemployed 
increases the reservation wage: the larger the subsidy and the longer its expected duration, the less 
individuals are attracted by work, triggering the so-called “welfare trap”.  
In our model individuals do not operate in a completely rational manner: behaviour is allowed 
to depend on psychological and cultural factors. In neo-classical economics individuals’ preferences 
are taken as given and the budget line describing available options is only subject to exogenous 
changes; to acknowledge for psycho-social factors, both these assumptions will be relaxed. 
The main features of the model are sketched as follows:
(i) The object of individual’s decision is search effort. Greater effort increases the probability to 
find a job, but reduces current utility by reducing time for leisure. Unemployment benefits and 
social assistance are treated in a unified framework
4. Stigma may be attached to welfare 
provision. Following Moffit (1983), we let stigma represent a fixed cost of entering welfare
5; as 
a consequence, not all the eligible will eventually claim the benefit. In this framework, at every 
point in time, the unemployed has to take the joint decision: 1) whether to search for work; 2) 
whether to enter welfare.
(ii) Behaviour may also be affected by psychological and cultural factors (Bane and Ellwood 1994). 
We claim that these factors should be especially relevant in those environments where stigma is 
strong. “… Living on public support, which in certain cultural contexts is equated with living on 
charity, exposes the individual to social disqualification and stigma, imprisoning him in 
marginal social networks and isolating him – even more than unemployment – from those social 
contacts   which  help  to  gain  access  to   work   opportunities.   Demoralization   and  learned 
4 Although Contini and Negri (developing a model not formalized in mathematical terms) clearly distinguish between 
unemployment compensations and social assistance, we treat income support policies in a unified framework because 
we wish to keep the specification simple.    
5 Moffit also allows for a variable component, depending on the size if the benefit, but this component does not seem to 
be empirically relevant.helplessness may also take root…” (Contini and Negri 2006), favouring reduction of the 
effectiveness of job-search. Moreover, prospective employers themselves might be less willing 
to   hire   welfare   recipients.   Thus,   stigma   may   play   a   role   in   reducing   re-employment 
probabilities, even when the individual rationally chooses to undertake the job-search.
 
(iii) Values and attitudes can be affected when individuals live in situations of socio-economic 
exclusion and spatial segregation; if the majority of the neighbours relies on welfare rather than 
work, preferences can change, making work less attractive. Our model allows for interaction 
among individuals; each individual occupies a cell in a bi-dimensional space, and the behaviour 
of those in adjacent cells contribute to shaping individual’s preferences.
Let  ( ) L C f U , =  be the utility function associated with consumption C and leisure L. We 
operate in a rigid labor market with full time jobs only. People are assumed to consume all their 
earnings (there are no savings, nor other sources of income), thus, consumption amounts to  current 
income. Income is CE if employed, C0 if unemployed with no benefit – taken to be below the 
poverty threshold - and CB with income support, where C0< CB < CE. A universalistic policy is 
considered, so that all the unemployed (who are also poor) are eligible for welfare benefits, which 
are in principle of unlimited duration.
Standardizing total time to 2, we fix minimum time for leisure L to 1, time for work is 1 and 
time devoted to job search is either  s=0 or s=1. No search on the job is allowed, so that L=1 for the 
employed and  L=2-s  for the unemployed. Market wage is always higher than individuals’ 
reservation wage: f(C0,2) < f(CE,1). Thus, if no benefits are provided, it is better to work rather than 
not work. 
Present utility for the unemployed is a development of the simple Cobb-Douglas function 
b a L C U = . We assume that stigma is the only factor responsible for take-up behaviour
6. With 
stigma, since individuals have to choose whether to search for work and whether to claim the 
benefit, current utility depends on C, L, and A, where A=1 if he is assisted and 0 otherwise. With no 
stigma, i.e with no disincentives to enter welfare, individuals will never choose A=0. On the other 
hand, in environments where benefit provision is disqualified, a cost f of entering welfare must be 
applied. Moffit (1983) proposes the following model:
( ) ( ) A L C U A L C U f - = , , ,               
6 According to Hernanz (2004), various potential explanations of low-take-up rates for welfare benefits have been 
addressed in the literature: pecuniary determinants, information costs, administrative costs, social and psychological 
costs (stigma).  Adapting this specification to the Cobb-Douglas function and allowing for cultural effects in the 
model - see point (iii) above – according to which preferences change if individuals are “close” to 
other welfare recipients - we obtain the following function:
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where f is the proportion of welfare recipients among the person’s neighbours. When stigma is 
present, f>0 and individuals living close to other welfare recipients will be less affected by stigma: 
their preferences will change, reducing the value of work. In the extreme case where all neighbours 
are welfare recipients (f=1), no stigma effects are perceived by the unemployed, who are thus more 
prone to enter welfare and eventually stop searching for a job.
The probability of finding a job is allowed to change with elapsed time in unemployment, as 
skills tend to become obsolete and social contacts facilitating the match between labor supply and 
demand loosen (Granovetter 1995). Moreover, we assume that stigma can be the cause of further 
reduction in employment prospects as time spent in welfare grows longer - see point (ii). The re-
employment probability is thus specified as follows:
 





q q g - - = 1 1 0
  (2)
where g0 is the corresponding probability at the beginning of the unemployment spell. Loss of skills 
developing with time elapsed in unemployment is related to  q
U, while reduction of work 




A are respectively time elapsed in unemployment and in welfare. Notice that t
A ≤t
U, as people 
can delay welfare entry. With no search there are no chances of receiving job offers, while re-
employment allows to recover the original value g0.  
We assume that the employed are satisfied with their work activity, so that there is no search 
on the job, but they will loose their current job with probability d. The unemployed, instead, choose 
whether to search for work or not. We assume that they evaluate present utility U0 and the expected 
utility for two time units ahead; search effort and welfare participation decisions are determined by 
0 ) , ( 0 0 max V A s , where V0 is given by: 
[ ] [ ] 2
2 1 0 0 R U E R U E U V + + =   where [ ] t U E  is the expected utility at time t, and  ( ) 1 , 0 Î R  is a discount factor. Hence:
where st and At represent search effort and welfare participation at time t. UE is the utility of being 
employed, while pt is the probability to work at time t+1 given job-search at time t. Notice that pt 
itself is a function of st . Individuals are assumed to correctly forecast their loss of employability, 
even when the loss is due to welfare participation
7. 
There are 2
6=64 different combinations of values 0 and 1 for (s0, A0, s1, A1, s2, A2). V0   is 
evaluated at each combination
8, and the (s0, A0) maximising V0 is taken as the optimal choice for 
time t=0. In the following time unit, options are evaluated with respect to new current utility and the 
utility of the two subsequent points in time. Thus, the values of (s1, A1, s2, A2) maximizing V0 need 
not to be equal to the actual choices that will be made at times t=1 and t=2
9. 
Because of the progressive loss of employability with time elapsed in unemployment and 
welfare, job-search can be the optimal choice when employability is still high, but it becomes no 
longer optimal when employment prospects fall below a certain level (Richiardi and Contini 2006 
demonstrate this result with regard to decisions taken with respect to an infinite time horizon). 
Moreover, if with no stigma everybody takes the benefit from the very beginning, when stigma is 
present the eligible might not ask for income support at the onset of the unemployment spell, 
delaying claiming when search effectiveness falls below some threshold. 
3.  The simulation design
The analytical model is investigated via a discrete-time
10 agent-based simulation (Tesfatsion 2001)
11
The simulation schedule is reported in Figure 1. At time 0 the model is initialized and the world (an 
IxJ torus grid) is inhabited by agents, each agent having 8 neighbours. A fraction fractionEmployed 
7 This is not necessarily a sensible hypothesis. The issue will be the object of future investigation. 
8 Notice that working condition at time t=2 depends on previous choices and, given that the working condition at time 
t=3 is not taken into consideration at time t=0, the value of s2 maximizing V0 is necessarily 0.       
9 This feature is addressed in the economic literature as “time inconsistency” of choices. In recent years the issue has 
been object of increasing interest among social scientists (see for example Fang and Silverman, 2004; O’ Donoghue and 
Rabin, 1999).   
10 Discrete-time simulation means that the state of the system is updated (i.e. observed) only at discrete (generally 
constant) time intervals. No reference is made to the timing of events within a period – see, for example, (Allison 1982).
11 The simulation is written and is build on the open source JAS simulation platform (Sonnessa 2004). The code can be 
downloaded from http://193.205.134.131/Entra/download/P004473/allegati_doc/Stigma.rar or requested to the authors.
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+ + - + =of these agents start as employed, while the others are unemployed. Given that employability 
decreases over time in unemployment and welfare, infinitely lived agents would inevitably end up 
in unemployment, which is an absorbing state of the system. To prevent such a deadlock we assume 
that agents exit the labor market after maxAge periods. At the beginning of each period exiting 
agents are replaced by new agents. Again, with probability fractionEmployed each new agent start 
as employed, while with probability (1-fractionEmployed) it starts as unemployed. Seniority of the 
agents is randomly initialized at time 0.
Figure 1. Simulation schedule
The scheduling of the events within each simulation period should be interpreted as suggested 
in Figure 2. Employed workers do nothing for the whole period. Unemployed individuals choose 
their search intensity and whether they are willing to enter welfare at the beginning of the period. Search lasts for the whole period, while benefits are given, if the agent is still unemployed, at the 
end of the period. Transitions (from unemployment to employment and from employment to 
unemployment) also take place at the end of the period. As a consequence, employed workers who 
are fired at the end of a period start the following period with maximum employability g0 (their 
elapsed duration in unemployment and welfare is still 0 at the time when they begin searching for a 
new job).
Figure 2. Continuous interpretation of the discrete time schedule
The speed of convergence to the equilibrium, defined as a regime when all relevant time series 
look stationary, depends on three key parameters: the equilibrium share of people in assistance, the 
size of the population and the number of periods individuals stay in the labor market. Given the 
neighbourhood effect formalised in (1), whenever one individual enters welfare it increases the 
likelihood that other individuals around him, if unemployed, would also choose to become assisted. 
Hence, the length of the chain reaction that is triggered depends on how many individuals are at risk 
(i.e. unemployed) and, for given levels of stigma, on the amount of the benefit. 
With 900 simulated individuals, even in the worst case scenarios convergence is obtained 
within 250 periods, i.e. about 2 generations. All the results reported below refer to stationary values, 
averaged over a large number of periods. 
In   each   period   the   state   of   the   system   can   be   summarized   along   two   dimensions: 
unemployment and unemployed behaviour, which in turn depends on search intensity and welfare 
take-up. Figure 3 shows a typical simulation outcome: the blue cells in the grid are for employed 
individuals; red cells are for the unassisted unemployed and yellow cells are for the assisted 
unemployed. The share of active searchers would complete the description of the system. Note that 
assisted individuals can cluster together: this is due to the fact that the stigma associated with being 
in welfare is reduced if the neighbourhood contains a higher proportion of similarly assisted 
individuals.                                          Figure 3. Simulation outcome
The simulation design has been implemented with parameter values summarised in Table 1. 
We consider three different environments. One with no stigma effects, the other two characterised 
by different levels of stigma – which is assumed to affect both the component f in the utility 
function (1), and the component q
A in the re-employment probability function (2). Ideally, the NO 
STIGMA  environment should represent Northern Europe countries, while situations with stigma 
should somehow depict Southern Europe countries. Having no objective way to fix realistic 
parameters (we are not aware of studies dealing with this issue), we have chosen two alternative 
combinations: the one labelled as STIGMA 1 has lower values of both f and q
A  than STIGMA2. Thus, the 
latter represents a situation with stronger stigma. Nevertheless, it is important to note that, given 
that these values are not empirically founded, we are not able to denote these situations as carrying 
out “low” or “strong” stigma in absolute terms
12.    
Income with no benefit is set at C0=1 and market wage at CE=4. Two levels of income support 
are considered:  CB=1 and CB=2.5, providing 37.5% and 62.5% of market wage respectively. Re-
employment probabilities at the beginning of the unemployment spell can take two alternative 
values: g0=0.25 or g0=0.4, reflecting situations where individuals can have worse or better job-
prospects. On the other side, the employed will loose their job with a probability d=0.05. Core of 
12 A calibration exercise is one of  our aims for future work.the utility function is  b a L C U = , with a=2 and b=0.5
13. We think of each time unit as one month. 
For this reason the discount factor is close to 1 (R=0.98). Individuals are followed for 120 time 
units, thus “life time” is 10 years. All individuals are unemployed at “birth”, as Fraction_Employed 
(see section 3) is set to 0.  
 
Table 1. Simulation parameter values
4. Results
Cross-section results are summarised in Tables 2a-2d. The following statistics have been computed 
with   respect   to   the   three   environments   considered   (NO  STIGMA,  STIGMA1,  STIGMA2):   average 
percentage
14 across time of unemployed and welfare recipients, percentage of unemployed actively 
searching for a job among assisted and not assisted, welfare take-up rate, average number of 
assisted neighbours for the assisted. In order to highlight the role of interaction among agents, 
simulations where stigma is present but neighbourhood effects are not at work have been carried-
out as well. 
We have also performed a sensitivity analysis aimed at exploring the effects on the cross-
section indicators of the variation of each parameter with a finer grid (holding the other constant). 
Results related to q
A and f are reported in Figures 4 and 5.   
13  These values are not empirically founded either. They have been set  ad hoc, in order to bring about possibly 
“reasonable values” for present utility in the different situations under consideration. The consumption component of 
the function amounts to 16 for employment, 2.25 or 6.25 for unemployment with income support, 1 for unemployment 
with no benefit. Since search effort { } 1 , 0 Î s  and consequently leisure { } 1 , 2 Î L , given consumption, with no searching 
utility is 2  times utility with searching.    
14 In order to limit the complexity of the results, standard errors have not been reported; notice that their values are 
generally small, so that conclusions are unaffected. 
Environments
NO STIGMA:  q
A=0, f=0
















Life length 120 time units
Fraction employed Fraction_Employed=0Longitudinal results are described in Tables 3a-3d. We show some features of the distribution 
of unemployment and welfare spells
15, together with the number of spells in the observation 
window. In particular, given the  heavy skewness of the distribution, we report the 50°, 75° and 90° 
percentiles (when estimable), the highest non-censored spell length and the estimated survival at 
that value. 
The main results can be sketched as follows.
Welfare
Take-up rates are higher with no stigma while welfare spells are longer with stigma.
a) Take-up rate. It is always 100% with no stigma, as welfare entry has no costs. From figures 
4 and 5 we can see that the percentage of the eligible entering welfare is sensitive to f - and 
this is a well known result - but also to q
A. When q
A reaches a certain level, the take-up rate 
starts decreasing. This should be due to the fact that the unemployed correctly anticipate 
their future loss of employability, and thus, if this loss is strong, they might prefer not to 
enter welfare
16. The joint effect of  f  and q
A can be observed in tables 2a-2d. For high 
benefit, take-up rate is always 100%, but with low benefit, rates are lower with stigma, in 
particular with stronger stigma. Given that neighbourhood effects have an impact on 
preferences, lowering the perceived cost of welfare entry, take-up rates can rise if these 
effects are at work (cfr. columns II and III, figure 2c).     
b) Welfare spell length.  As expected, because of the progressive loss of employability 
occurring when assisted, welfare spells are found to be much longer with stigma in all the 
situations considered, and the tendency is strengthened with increasing level of social 
disqualification (figures 3a-3d).
Unemployment
As we have pointed out before, job-search models including stigma predict that stigma – acting 
as a work incentive – reduce unemployment. According to our model, this conclusion is no 
longer true. In all the situations under consideration, the percentage of unemployed is higher 
15 Deduced from the Kaplan-Meier estimate of the survival function.
16 Notice that if individuals were not able to forecast the progressive reduction of employment prospects (see also 
footnote 8)  we should observe a different result.with STIGMA1 than with NO STIGMA (ceteris paribus). Moreover, we observe a lower percentage of 
unemployed in some environments with no stigma and high benefit than we do in environments 
with stigma and low benefit. For example, with g0=0.4, with STIGMA1 and benefit set at 1.5, 
26.3% of the simulated population is unemployed; the percentage falls at 14.3% with NO STIGMA 
and benefit set at 2.5.           
c) Unemployment spell length. From result b) we know that, for those who enter welfare, 
welfare spells are longer with stigma. On the other hand, not all the unemployed are welfare 
recipients: a lower number of people enter welfare if there is stigma (see result a). Thus, no 
simple   general   result   seems   to   hold.   In   all   the   simulations   we   have   carried   out, 
unemployment spells are longer with stigma than with no stigma, but spells do not increase 
(on the contrary, they can get shorter) as stigma gets stronger.  
d) Proportion of unemployed. Everybody is unemployed “at birth”, but since unemployment 
spell length is not monotonically related with stigma (result c), also the relation between the 
proportion of unemployed and stigma cannot be simply determined  a priori. In all the 
simulated cases, the stock of unemployed is always higher in environment STIGMA1 than with 
NO STIGMA, but it can become either even higher or much lower in the environment STIGMA2. 
From figure 4, we see that the percentage of unemployed follows a reversed-U shape as q
A 
increases. The reason for this behaviour seems to be related, once again, to the fact that the 
unemployed, forecasting future loss of employability if assisted, can decide not to enter 
welfare and keep searching for work if the anticipated loss is too big (see result a). Notice 
that, holding constant  q
A, the proportion of unemployed behaves as predicted in the 
traditional models (decreasing steadily) when f varies.
Welfare (cont.)
e) Proportion of assisted (welfare participation rate). As we have seen (results a and b) with 
stigma a lower number of eligible enters welfare, but those who do will stay longer. 
Moreover, since the size of the eligible population (i.e., the percentage of unemployed) does 
not depend monotonically on stigma, the proportion of welfare recipients over the whole 
population does not vary in a simple fashion. The stock of assisted is found to be much 
lower with no stigma than with stigma when both the level of the benefit and initial 
employability are relatively high (table 2d). On the other hand, with stronger stigma and low benefit, the size of the assisted population can be very small or even null (see tables 2a and 
2c, columns iv and v).        
Job-search 
f) With no stigma welfare recipients keep searching for a job much more often than with 
stigma. In all the simulated cases, the number of job-searchers among the assisted decreases 
with the strength of stigma (although figure 4 shows that it is not a monotonic pattern). The 
job-search behaviour of the unassisted population is not very clear, as that population can be 
very small in many cases. 
Assisted neighbours
g) The average number of assisted neighbours for those who are assisted themselves provides a 
rough indication of whether the assisted individuals tend to cluster together. Clustering 
should occur with stigma, when neighbourhood effects are at work. Yet, this number by 
itself is not very informative: it should be compared with the average number of assisted 
neighbours corresponding to a completely random allocation of welfare recipients in the bi-
dimensional space. If the proportion of assisted is p, with a constant number of neighbours 
n, the relevant distribution is that a binomial, thus the average is simply np. Given the shape 
of the grid, where some individuals have 8 neighbours, those on the edge have 5, and those 









8 p p p + + . Both 
the observed average number and the expected value under the assumption of randomness 
are reported. There is no strong evidence of clustering effects, perhaps with the exception of 
environment STIGMA2, case of low benefit and low employability, neighbourhood effects at 
work (column v, Table 2a).Table 2. Cross section statistics.
   













% unempl. 25.6 56.6 57.0 22.5 23.2
% assisted 21.9 54.4 54.9 0.9 1.4
take-up rate 100.0 100.0 100.0 5.1 7.2
%search | assist 100.0 24.3 24.1 0.0 0.23
%search | not ass - - - 100.0 100.0
Mean n° assisted 
neighbours
Observed/Random
1.91/1.75 4.44/4.35 4.46/4.35 0.095/0.072 0.17/0.11
2a. Benefit low (CB=1.5) and low employability (g0=0.25)













% unempl. 59.8 83.3 88.8 83.8 89.2
% assisted 57.8 82.5 88.2 83.0 88.7
take-up rate 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
%search | assist 12.8 3.6 2.2 3.6 2.1
%search | not ass - - - - -
Mean n° assisted 
neighbours
Observed/Random
4.65/4..39 6.60/6.27 7.05/6.70 6.64/6.31 7.09/6.74













% unempl. 13.3 14.6 26.3 13.2 13.2
% assisted 9.0 2.2 21.5 0.00 0.00
take-up rate 100.0 21.5 95.2 0.00 0.00
%search | assist 99.0 32.4 43.4 - -
%search | not ass - 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Mean n° assisted 
neighbours
Observed/Random
0.92/0.69 0.16/0.17 2.14/1.63 0/0 0/0
2c. Benefit low (CB=1.5) and high employability (g0=0.4)













% unempl. 14.3 44.0 44.7 54.7 60.2
% assisted 10.1 41.3 41.9 52.4 58.2
take-up rate 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
%search | assist 84.9 15.5 14.9 10.1 7.6
%search | not ass - - - - -
Mean n° assisted 
neighbours
Observed/Random
1.0/0.8 3.4/3.1 3.5/3.2 4.3/4.0 4.7/4.4
2d. Benefit high (CB=2.5) and high employability (g0=0.4)Table 3. Longitudinal statistics














N° spells 21102 14262 14214 21502 21759
50°, 75°, 90° p. 3, 6, 11 3, 10, (n.e)
1 3, 10, (n.e)
1 3, 6, 11 3, 6, 11
All cens. from time 22 13 13 45 45
% all cens 2.6 21.0 21.7 0.9 0.7
WELFARE  SPELLS
N° spells 15325 10530 10448 135 98
50°, 75°, 90° p. 3, 7, 12 4, ( n.e ), ( n.e ) 4, ( n.e ), ( n.e ) (n.e.), ( n.e ), ( n.e ) (n.e.), ( n.e ), ( n.e )
highest non cens 
time (h.n.c..t.)
21 12 12 4 1
survival at h.n.c..t. 3.6 29.2 29.6 97.8 100
3a. Benefit low (CB=1.5) and low employability (g0=0.25)














N° spells 8557 4505 4670 5988 3937
50°, 75°, 90° p. 3, (n.e.), (n..e.) (n.e.),(n.e.),(n.e.) (n.e.),(n.e.),(n.e.) (n.e.),(n.e.),(n.e.) (n.e.),(n.e.),(n.e.)
highest non cens 
time (h.n.c..t.)
6 3 2 3 2
survival at h.n.c..t. 26.0 55.0 64.8 54.8 66.5
WELFARE  SPELLS
N° spells 6291 3429 3640 4549 3051
50°, 75°, 90° p. 3, (n.e.), (n..e.) (n.e.),(n.e.),(n.e.) (n.e.),(n.e.),(n.e.) (n.e.),(n.e.),(n.e.) (n.e.),(n.e.),(n.e.)
highest non cens 
time (h.n.c..t.)
5 2 2 2 1
survival at h.n.c..t. 35.4 72.0 82.4 72.1 85.6














N° spells 23639 23373 21092 23807 25645
50°, 75°, 90° p. 2, 3, 6 2, 3, 16 2, 4, 8 2, 3, 6 2, 3, 6
highest non cens 
time (h.n.c..t.)
30 21 17 - -
survival at h.n.c..t. 0.08 0.74 5.2 - -
WELFARE  SPELLS
N° spells 13569 615 10448 1 1
50°, 75°, 90° p. 2, 4, 6 4, ( n.e ), ( n.e ) 2, 5, (n.e.) (n.e.), ( n.e ), ( n.e ) (n.e.), ( n.e ), ( n.e )
highest non cens 
time (h.n.c..t.)
30 11 15 - -
survival at h.n.c..t. 0.14 26.5 10.2 - -
3c. Benefit low (CB=1.5) and high employability (g0=0.4)














N° spells 28743 18052 16914 13060 13480
50°, 75°, 90° p. 2, 3, 6 2, 4, (n.e.) 2, 4, (n.e.)  2, 5, (n.e.) 2, 5, (n.e.)
highest non cens 
time (h.n.c..t.)
15 6 6 5 5
survival at h.n.c..t. 0.6 14.6 15.5 21.9 25.6
WELFARE  SPELLS
N° spells 16730 10671 9921 7734 8013
50°, 75°, 90° p. 2, 4, 6 2, 5, (n.e.) 2, (n.e.), (n.e.) 3, (n.e.), (n.e.) 3, (n.e.), (n.e.)
highest non cens 
time (h.n.c..t.)
14 5 5 4 4
survival at h.n.c..t. 1.1 24.7 25.5 36.9 42.9




















































Figure 4. Simulated results for varying q
A with f=1, CB=1.5, g0=0.4,




































Figure 5. Simulated results for varying f with q
A=1, CB=1.5, g0=0.4, 
    with neighbourhood effects  5. Conclusions  
In traditional job-search models stigma is shown to negatively affect welfare take-up rates; 
accordingly,  unemployment levels tend to decrease with stigma. Thus, although from the point of 
view of attaining the goal of poverty reduction stigma is considered “a bad”, because high take-up 
rates are among the goal of the policies (Hernanz  et al.  2004), from the point of view of 
unemployment reduction stigma is considered “a good”. 
Under the assumption that social disqualification attached to receiving the benefit not only 
affects preferences - by representing a cost of  welfare entry - but that it leads to a reduction of 
search effectiveness as well, this mainstream conclusion no longer holds. We show that the 
unemployment rate is related to the amount of stigma in a non-monotonic fashion: after some point 
it does decrease with the level of stigma, but “in the beginning” (moving away from the no stigma 
situation) the unemployment level is shown to increase with stigma. 
This result could help explaining why unemployment rates, poverty rates and persistence of 
poverty are lower in Northern Europe than in Southern Europe, even if welfare and unemployment 
benefits are much more generous there. 
The main limit is that parameter values were set arbitrarily and not derived from empirical 
evidence. This means that which values of (f, q
A) are adequate for each group of countries – even in 
a stylized fashion – cannot be assessed yet. This point will be the object of further investigation.  
Policy implications are in principle very interesting, although the reduction of stigma, 
involving well rooted attitudes and beliefs, is not an easy goal to accomplish. Given that higher 
unemployment and welfare participation levels are observed when neighbourhood are allowed, the 
obvious conclusion is that - from many other points of view as well, indeed - spatial segregation 
and urban ghettoes should be heavily contrasted.  References
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